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 Intergroup revenge: a laboratory experiment 
 
Abstract: Several everyday examples imply that humans reciprocate not only towards direct 
perpetrators, but also to entire groups, thereby potentially affecting innocent bystanders. We 
test the hypothesis that people are predisposed to reciprocate against groups. In a laboratory 
experiment, subjects who were helped or harmed by another player’s action reacted by helping 
or harming another member of that player’s group. This group reciprocity was only observed 
when one group was seen as unfairly advantaged. Thus, activation of group reciprocity may be 
a causal mechanism that links perceived injustice to intergroup conflict. We discuss the 
relevance of group reciprocity to political and economic phenomena including violence, 
discrimination and team competition.  
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 1. Introduction 
Humans categorize themselves and others by group membership. While such categorization 
need not necessarily affect behavior, at times it certainly does. In this paper, we analyze how 
group membership affects behavior of recipients of actions towards innocent third parties, who 
happen to share the group membership with a previous, initial actor. More specifically, we want 
to know if, and if so under which circumstances, revenge is not only oriented at direct 
perpetrators, but expands to the entire group they belong to.  
At first sight it appears straightforward that people take revenge against entire groups, not only 
against direct individual perpetrators, even in routine social and economic life. For instance, 
consumers buy fewer products from countries which they see as politically antagonistic (Klein 
et al. 1999, Leong et al. 2008). Further, on days after terrorist bombings in Israel, Jewish (Arab) 
judges become more likely to favor Jewish (Arab) plaintiffs in their decisions, and Israeli Arabs 
face higher prices for used cars  (Shayo and Zussman 2011, Zussman 2012). On a political 
level, for instance, Keynes (1922) perceived the Treaty of Paris’ devastation of the German 
economy as an act of revenge, and quoted Thomas Hardy’s play The Dynasts: “Nought remains 
/ But vindictiveness here amid the strong, / And there amid the weak an impotent rage.” In its 
most extreme case, revenge against groups may trigger violent intergroup conflict. After an 
argument between an Indian Dalit and an upper caste farmer, upper caste villagers attacked 80 
Dalit families (Hoff et al. 2011). In Atlanta, 1906, after newspaper allegations of black attacks 
on white women, a group of white people rioted, killing 25 black men (Bauerlein 2001). In 
both cases, innocent people were made to suffer for the real or supposed crimes of others. 
Many field studies of intergroup violence report similar tit-for-tat processes, with harm to 
members of one group being avenged by attacks on previously uninvolved coethnics of the 
original attackers (Horowitz 1985, 2001; Chagnon 1988). 
The psychology of reciprocity may indeed play a part in these phenomena. Laboratory 
experiments show that humans reciprocate harm done to them, even at a cost to themselves 
(Fehr and Gächter 2000; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). A natural extension, which would 
account for the episodes described above, is that humans reciprocate not only towards 
individuals, but also towards entire groups. We label retaliation against a perpetrator’s group 
members group reciprocity.   
However, these examples do not provide conclusive evidence for the motivations underlying 
group reciprocal behavior. In field studies it is hard to distinguish group reciprocity from in-
group bias under external threat (Sherif et al. 1961), or from strategic considerations, e.g. if 
people are rewarded for defending their coethnics (Chagnon 1988). Therefore, to identify group 
reciprocity cleanly, we ran a computerized laboratory experiment. 
We emphasize that we do not believe real-world scenarios like those above can be recreated in 
the lab. This holds especially for episodes of violent conflict. However, experimenters can 
study analogous situations, such as intergroup contests and vendettas (Bornstein et al. 1992, 
2003; Weisel and Zultan 2013; Abbink and Herrmann 2009). Here, we test for an individual 
psychological mechanism which may underlie real-world phenomena. We also examine how 
inequality and unfairness affect group reciprocity.  
Our theory relates to existing work on in-group favouritism. As previous experiments show, 
people value group membership, and prefer to interact with others from their own group 
(Hargreaves-Heap and Zizzo 2009; Currarini and Mengel 2012). They cooperate more with in-
group members (de Cremer and van Vugt 1999; Goette et al. 2006; Guala et al. 2012). Group 
members give more to each other, punish each other less and reward each other more (Bernhard 
et al. 2006; Chen and Li 2009; Currarini and Mengel 2012). Shared group identity may also 
provide a simple coordination mechanism for individuals (Chen and Chen 2011).  
However, these phenomena appear insufficient to explain extreme prejudice of the form 
outlined above or even violence against outgroups (Brewer 1999). Indeed, in-group bias 
disappears when subjects allocate a “bad” such as exposure to aversive noise (Mummendey et 
al. 1992). In response to this explanatory gap, psychologists have developed theories of 
intergroup emotions, including “vicarious retribution”, a propensity to retaliate against groups 
(Lickel et al. 2006). We extend this literature by conducting an incentivized experiment which 
identifies group reciprocity, while avoiding a number of confounds. Of existing experiments, 
some have examined only verbal attitudes (Stenstrom et al. 2008), while others cannot cleanly 
distinguish individual-level reciprocity from group reciprocity, because the reciprocator’s 
choices affect the whole outgroup including the individual who committed the offence 
(Gaertner et al. 2008, Abbink and Herrmann 2009). Our design makes it clear to subjects that 
they are interacting with different members of the same group. 
Our experiment also differentiates group reciprocity from “generalized” or “downstream 
indirect” reciprocity. This is a phenomenon in which another person’s helpful/harmful 
behaviour causes the subject to help/harm other people in general (Dufwenberg et al. 2001, 
Greiner and Levatti 2005, Stanca 2009). Generalized reciprocity could be supported by various 
mechanisms, including learning, imitation, or changes in mood. By contrast, group reciprocity 
is directed specifically against the original offender’s group, not just against people in general. 
We distinguish group reciprocity from generalized reciprocity by including control treatments 
where subjects can reciprocate against a “neutral” third party. 
As well as testing for the existence of group reciprocity, we also make a start at understanding 
its correlates. We examine the relationship between group reciprocity and fairness perceptions. 
Qualitative studies and cross-country regressions both show a link between inequality, 
unfairness, and intergroup conflict (Tambiah 1996; Horowitz 2001; Cederman et al. 2011). In 
different experimental sessions we varied the perceived unfairness of intergroup allocations, by 
allocating a reward to one group either randomly, or as the reward for group performance in a 
quiz. We show that group reciprocity is only observed when rewards are allocated randomly – a 
treatment which subjects perceived as less fair. Also, subjects who perceived the experiment as 
less fair were more likely to group-reciprocate.  
 
2. Experimental Design 
Our experiment consisted of three stages: a group-induction stage, a stage with the economic 
games, and a post-experimental questionnaire. We first describe the stages on a more general 
level before detailing the games subjects played. 
2.1. Experimental Stages 
In the first stage, we induced group identity. Subjects were randomly allocated into four color-
coded groups of four: green, orange, purple, and brown. Each subject’s color group was shown 
throughout the experiment by a colored strip at the side of the screen. Subjects then played a 
quiz, consisting of 20 trivia questions, with their group members, during which they could 
communicate by chat.1 After the quiz, subjects were rewarded for group performance. Each 
group member’s correct answer was rewarded with 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU, 1 
ECU = 5 Euro cent) for the group. A group’s earnings were divided equally among its 
members.2  
In addition, in 12 of our 15 sessions, members of one randomly selected group received a 100 
ECU bonus. In the remaining three sessions, the group with the highest score in the quiz 
received the bonus. We used these random bonus and winner bonus sessions to manipulate 
perceptions of intergroup fairness.3 The group receiving the bonus was announced directly after 
                                                 
1 It was forbidden to communicate personal information. All subjects followed these 
instructions. 
2 100 ECU per subject were described as an endowment for the second part of the experiment. 
To ensure that each subject had at least 100 ECU, minimum group earnings of 400 ECU were 
implemented. This endowment was purely a framing manipulation to increase subjects’ sense 
that they had “earned” their ECU. 
3 The reason for the imbalance between the number of sessions in each treatment is as follows: 
we wished to examine individual-level correlates of group reciprocity, so we ran extra sessions 
using the random bonus treatment which turned out to induce group reciprocity. Note that our 
results are significant when aggregating across all types of sessions. 
the quiz. Subjects then answered a brief questionnaire, including the question “How fair did 
you think the quiz was?” with answers on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. We expected that subjects 
would perceive a bonus to the winning team as fairer than a randomly given bonus (cf. Ball and 
Eckel 1998, Cherry et al. 2002).  
The second stage was the core of our experiment. In it, subjects played eight repetitions of two 
rounds of a two-player linear public goods game (PGG). In each public goods game, both 
subjects shared a fund of 100 ECU. Each subject could take up to 50 ECU out of the fund. ECU 
remaining in the fund were multiplied by 1.5 and shared equally between the two.  
The basic structure of each repetition was as follows: subjects played a PGG with one other 
subject, from a set of four subjects. They then received feedback about exactly one other 
subject’s play from the four. Lastly, they played another PGG with one other subject from the 
four. This two-round structure allows subjects to observe another player’s behaviour in the first 
round, and react to it in the second round. The details of the matching protocol are described in 
detail below. After the second round, subjects learned the choices of both their partners, and 
their total earnings from the repetition. Total earnings from one randomly chosen repetition 
were used for payment.   
We framed the game as a decision to “take” ECU from the common fund in order to emphasize 
that this decision would harm the other player.4 In the public goods game, actions that harm the 
other are beneficial to oneself. This makes our results comparable to previous work which uses 
public goods games to measure individual-level reciprocity (e.g. Fischbacher et al. 2001). It 
would also be interesting and important to use a game in which other-harming actions were 
costly. 
2.2. Matching 
                                                 
4 By “harm”, we simply mean “reduce the other’s earnings”. We cannot be sure whether our 
subjects perceived taking from the common fund as harmful or simply as not helpful, since this 
depends on what they perceived to be the default or baseline action. 
Within each of the eight repetitions, subjects were matched in groups of four. Matching was 
different in different treatments (which varied across repetitions, i.e. this is a within-subject 
design). These treatments were designed to identify group reciprocity, while avoiding several 
potential confounds. 
Group reciprocity occurs when (a) a second party helps/harms the subject and (b) the subject 
responds by helping/harming another person in the second party’s group. To distinguish group 
reciprocity from individual reciprocity, the subject must know that the original person in part 
(a) is different from the person she helps/harms in part (b). We did this as follows: in each of 
the eight repetitions, subjects were shown the sets of four in which they were interacting. All 
four subjects’ color groups were represented on screen by colored circles, along with the 
subjects’ earnings from the quiz. We used arrows on screen to show each subject his or her 
partners for the first round PGG, and for the second round PGG.  
In first party/same group repetitions, subjects received feedback on their own partner’s play in 
the first PGG. This partner is labelled P1 in Figure 1. In the second round, subjects played 
against a different player (labelled P2). P2 was in the same group as P1. Thus, subjects learnt 
about how P1 had played against them in the first round, and could then react to this by playing 
differently against P1’s group member, P2.  
Subjects might react to P1’s play by playing differently against all players, not just against P1’s 
group members. This would be generalized reciprocity, as described above. To control for this, 
in first party/different group treatments, P2 was a member of a third, neutral group – neither the 
subject’s own group, nor P1’s group.5 
Thus, if we see a correlation between P1’s choice in the first round PGG with the subject, and 
the subject’s choice in the second round PGG against P2, this could be due to generalized 
reciprocity or group reciprocity. If this correlation is higher in the first party/same group 
                                                 
5 Subjects might become more generous to other members of their own group in the face of an 
external threat (e.g. Sherif et al. 1961). To avoid this potential confound, we ensured that P2 
was never from the subject’s own group. 
treatment, where P1 and P2 share a group membership, this can be ascribed to group 
reciprocity alone. 
Figure 1 summarizes the first party/same group and first party/different group treatments.
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Subj 
P2 
P1 
2. In the second round PGG, 
subject plays against P2, who is 
from the same group as P1. 
Subj 
P2 
P1 
1. In the first round PGG, 
subject plays against P1 and 
receives feedback. 
Subj 
P2 
P1 
2. In the second round PGG, 
subject plays against P2, who is 
from a different group than P1. 
Subj 
P2 
P1 
1. In the first round PGG, 
subject plays against P1 and 
receives feedback. 
Figure 1: first party treatments 
 The first party treatments examine how subjects respond to an outgroup member helping or 
harming them. Subjects might also respond to an outgroup member helping or harming 
someone else (say, someone else in the subject’s group), by helping or harming others in that 
outgroup. For example, ethnic riots often start when people take revenge on perceived slights 
offered to their co-ethnics or co-religionists (Horowitz 2001).  
The third party/same group and third party/different group treatments were designed to 
examine this. In these treatments, after the first round, subjects did not learn how their own 
partner played. Instead they learned how another player had played against someone else. They 
then played the second PGG against their first round partner again (whom we label P2, i.e. in 
all treatments, P1 is the first round player about whom the subject receives feedback, and P2 is 
the subject’s partner in the second round). As before, in same group treatments, P2 was in P1’s 
group, while in different group treatments, P2 was in an uninvolved neutral group. As before, 
subjects might react to P1’s play in the first PGG, by playing differently in the second PGG. If 
subjects reciprocate specifically against P1’s group members, we will see more reciprocity in 
the same group treatment than in the different group treatment.6 Figure 2 summarizes the third 
party/same group and third party/different group treatments. 
Between repetitions, subjects were rematched into different sets of 4. The rematching was fixed 
so that all subjects experienced all treatments over the 8 repetitions.7 This within-subjects 
design allows more accurate inferences about group reciprocity’s individual-level covariates. 
Treatments were balanced across repetitions and colour groups. 
After the eight repetitions, subjects answered a survey and were paid privately.
                                                 
6 In third party repetitions, we also varied whether the feedback player P1 was playing against 
someone from the subject’s own group, or someone from a different, neutral group. This allows 
us to examine whether subjects react more strongly when P1’s action affects a member of the 
subject’s own group. As overall results from third party treatments were null, we do not report 
further on this here. 
7 Two of our sessions used only the first party treatment. 
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Figure 2: third party treatments 
P1 
2.3 Variations 
Some repetitions and sessions varied this basic setup. 
One driver for group reciprocity might be changes in beliefs. For example, seeing someone 
from another group play selfishly, the subject might expect others from that group to do the 
same, and adjust her own play accordingly. To test how far this explains group reciprocity, in 
two of the eight repetitions, we elicited subjects’ beliefs about their second round partner’s play. 
Guesses were monetarily incentivized.  
We also looked at this in another way. In sessions 11 and 12, we did not elicit beliefs. Instead, 
in each set of four, one subject’s second round partner had an action chosen randomly for them 
by the computer, rather than being able to choose themselves. This was announced to both 
players before they made their choices. If expectations of the second round partner’s play 
drives group reciprocity, we would expect group reciprocity to disappear when the second 
round partner’s choice is made random. To gather more relevant data, these sessions only 
include first party treatments.  
In three sessions, we included a second quiz after half of the public goods games were played. 
Subjects played the quiz in a team consisting of members of other groups. This was to test the 
idea that cooperation with outgroup members in a joint task can reduce intergroup prejudice 
(Gaertner et al. 1993). Since results were null, we do not analyse this further here.  
In total, we ran 15 sessions of 16 subjects each.  Table 1 below summarizes the different 
variations in each session. 
Table 1: summary of sessions 
Sessions Treatments Quiz bonus Beliefs? Second quiz? 
1-3 First and third party Winning team Elicited No 
4-10 First and third party Random team Elicited No 
11-12 First party only Random team Random decisions No 
13-15 First and third party Random team Elicited Yes 
 
The experiment took place in the computer laboratory of the University of Hamburg, using the 
software zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were recruited from the laboratory's pool via 
ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 240 subjects participated on four separate days.8 Sessions lasted about 
an hour. Average earnings per session were 14.48 EUR.  
4. Model 
Here is a simple formal framework to help interpret our results. Suppose a subject interacts in 
sequence with two other agents. His or her utility is given by 
u(p, k1, k2) = V(p) + (μ + ν1SameGroup)k2 + (β + δ1SameGroup)k1k2    (1) 
where p is own material payoff, V(·) is a weakly concave function of p, k1 is the first agent’s 
kindness to the subject and k2 is the subject’s kindness to the second agent. The indicator 
variable 1SameGroup takes the value 1 when the two other agents share group membership, and 0 
otherwise. Subject’s kindness to agent j can be measured as (pj – pmin)/(pmax – pmin) where pj is 
j’s actual material payoff, and pmax and pmin are his maximum and minimum material payoffs 
over the set of the subject’s possible actions, taking j’s own action as given.   
The second term in this equation, μ + ν1SameGroup , represents altruism, where μ represents 
unconditional altruism towards others, irrespective of their group membership, and ν  allows for 
different levels of altruism towards members of specific groups. The third term, β + δ1SameGroup, 
represents reciprocity, and parametrizes the increase in utility when agent 1 is kinder/unkinder 
                                                 
8 The online appendix shows participants’ descriptive statistics, including demographics. 
to the subject and the subject is kinder/unkinder to agent 2. This specification is similar to 
Rabin (1993). More complex representations of kindness and reciprocity are plausible. For 
example, kindness might depend on a comparison between the actions of the other agent and of 
the subject. However, the approach above has the advantage of simplicity and clarity. 
 β represents the baseline level of generalized reciprocity for two other agents who are not in 
the same group. Our parameter of interest is δ. This measures the increase in reciprocity when 
agents 1 and 2 are in the same group: that is, the level of group reciprocity. We expect that δ > 
0. Group reciprocity on behalf of a third party can be analysed in this framework by letting k1 
be the first agent’s kindness to another player, as observed by the subject. 
5. Results 
Our estimation is based on equation (1). Let P1 take be the amount taken out of the common 
fund by participant P1 in the first PGG, whose choice is observed by the subject. Second round 
take is the amount taken by the subject out of the common fund in the second PGG, when 
playing against P2. Then k1 = (1 – P1 take/50) and k2 = (1 – Second round take/50). Using a 
quadratic for material welfare V(p),  and taking the first order condition, gives: 
 Second round take  = α + β P1 take + γ Same group + δ Same group ×  P1 take (2) 
where β and δ are the reciprocity coefficients defined in (1) above.9  
Our first result is: 
 
Result 1: There is significant evidence of first party group reciprocity across all sessions, and 
within random bonus sessions, but not within winner bonus sessions. 
 
To give a sense of Result 1, Figure 3 plots P1 take against Second round take in first party 
                                                 
9 A derivation is in the online appendix. 
treatments during random bonus sessions. The slope of the lines gives the correlation between 
P1’s behaviour in the first PGG, and the subject’s behaviour when playing P2 in the second 
PGG. This slope was roughly doubled when P1 and P2 were from the same group. Differences 
are largest when P1 took either 0 or 50 from the common fund: between them, these categories 
account for slightly more than 50% of observations.
 Figure 3:  The X axis shows the amount taken from the common fund in 
the first round PGG, by the subject’s partner P1. The Y axis shows the 
average amount taken from the common fund in the second round PGG by 
the subject, against P2. The dashed line shows first party/different group 
treatments. The solid line shows first party/same group treatments. Only 
random bonus sessions are plotted. Bars show ± 1 s.d. + p < 0.10;   ** p < 
0.01.   
 Subjects’ choices within a session may not be independent. As a conservative test of 
significance, we estimate β and β + δ in equation (2) separately for each session, and treat them 
as a single matched pair of observations. Within first party treatments, β + δ was higher than β 
in 11 out of 12 random bonus sessions, but in no winner bonus sessions. A signed-rank test on 
the matched pairs rejects the null that δ = 0 over all sessions at p = 0.0353 (two-sided), and over 
random bonus sessions only at p = 0.00928 (two-sided).  
We confirm Result 1 in an individual-level regression. Table 2 estimates equation (2) for first 
party treatments. Column 1 pools data from all sessions, columns 2 and 3 use random and 
winner bonus sessions respectively. Regressions include dummy variables for periods and for 
subjects (i.e. fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered at individual level. The coefficient on 
P1 take is not significantly different from zero: in other words, there is no evidence for 
generalized reciprocity. By contrast, the δ coefficient on P1 take × Same group is always 
positive. It is significant in random bonus sessions and across all sessions, but not in winner 
bonus sessions. These results are robust to alternative specifications.10 
                                                 
10
 These include removing the fixed effects; using session- rather than individual-clustered 
standard errors; adding controls for the history of play; and running Tobit regressions.  
Table 2: Estimates of group reciprocity, first party treatments. The dependent variable is the 
amount taken by subjects against P2 in round 2 of the PGG. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by subject. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
P1 take (β) 0.0289 0.0287 -0.0107 
 (0.0348)  (0.0386)  (0.0801)  
Same group (γ) -4.08 -3.94 -5.94 
 (1.59) * (1.75) * (4.13)  
P1 take ✕ Same group (δ) 0.179 0.185 0.202 
 (0.0474) *** (0.0525) *** (0.112) + 
Model Linear Linear Linear 
Controls Indiv. and period dummies Indiv. and period dummies Indiv. and period dummies 
N 1024 832 192 
N indiv. 240 192 48 
Adj. R2 0.0322 0.0353 0.0228 
 
Our second result is a null one: 
 
Result 2: Subjects showed no third party group reciprocity in either winner or random bonus 
sessions. 
 
In third party treatments, β + δ was higher than β in 7 out of 10 random bonus sessions and 2 
out of 3 winner bonus sessions (p = 0.216, two-sided, over all sessions). 
Table 3 estimates equation (2) for third party treatments. P1 take × Same group has a small 
effect. The effect is weakly significant in winner bonus sessions, but this is not robust to 
alternative specifications. 
Thus, we did not find evidence for third party group reciprocity. One explanation is that third 
party group reciprocity may require both a perception of outgroup entitativity, and strong 
identification with one’s own group. With a stronger group treatment, group reciprocity and in-
group altruism could combine to create third party group reciprocity. Alternatively, our design 
may have led subjects to focus on their own first-round public goods game, treating feedback 
from the other pair's game as less salient. We see this as an important topic for future research, 
since the scope of real-world conflicts often expands when third parties are drawn into existing 
disputes. 
Table 3: Estimates of group reciprocity, third party treatments. The dependent variable is the 
amount taken by subjects against P2 in round 2 of the PGG. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by subject. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
P1 take (β) 0.0641 0.0711 -0.00448 
 (0.0407)  (0.0477)  (0.0759)  
Same group (γ) -0.914 0.257 -8.25 
 (1.82)  (2.12)  (3.77) * 
P1 take ✕ Same group (δ) 0.0666 0.0366 0.205 
 (0.0536)  (0.0629)  (0.108) + 
Model Linear Linear Linear 
Controls Indiv. and period dummies Indiv. and period dummies Indiv. and period dummies 
N 832 640 192 
N indiv. 208 160 48 
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.012 0.0407 
Next, we look at correlates of group reciprocity, focusing on first party treatments in random 
bonus sessions. First, we test the hypothesis that group reciprocity is linked to perceptions of 
unfairness. Our post-quiz questionnaire included a 1-5 Likert scale “Did you feel that the quiz 
was fair?” Figure 4 shows the distribution of answers, by session type. Answers were less 
positive in random bonus sessions (Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma, p = 0.072). This difference 
may explain why we observe group reciprocity in random bonus sessions only. We can also test 
the hypothesis more directly. 
 
Result 3: Subjects who perceived the quiz as unfair displayed more group reciprocity. 
 
Column 1 of Table 4 interacts equation (2) with a dummy variable Fair, which is 1 if the 
subject perceived the quiz as fair or very fair. The coefficient on P1 take × Same group × Fair 
is negative and significant at the 10% level, and the summed coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. Subjects who perceived the quiz as unfair were about two-and-a-half times 
more group-reciprocal (0.271 versus 0.271 – 0.174 = 0.097).11 
Our next result concerns expectations. Observing P1’s actions might change the subject’s 
expectations about other members of P1’s group, including the subject’s second round partner 
P2. Subjects might then behave differently to P2 because of these expectations, rather than 
because they directly wished to harm other members of P1’s group. This would be a kind of 
statistical discrimination (Arrow 1972).12 Alternatively, group reciprocity may be “taste based”: 
subjects simply want to harm co-group-members of someone who has harmed them. 
 
                                                 
11 This is within random bonus sessions only. Results are similar in winner bonus sessions. 
Controlling for fairness perceptions reduces, but does not eliminate, the difference between 
sessions.  
12
 In fact, there were no significant correlations within groups.  
 Figure 4: Histogram of perceived fairness in random and 
winner bonus sessions (1 = “very unfair”, 5 = “very fair”) 
 
 
  
Result 4: Group reciprocity remained significant after controlling for subjects’ expectations of 
their second round partners’ choices. 
 
In repetitions 2 and 7 of sessions 1-10 and 13-15, we elicited subjects’ Expectations about their 
second round partner’s choice. These were incentivized by a payment based on the difference 
between the guess and the true amount taken by the partner. Column 2 of Table 4 adds 
Expectations to the basic regression. To increase efficiency, we multiply impute Expectations 
for repetitions where it was not elicited.13 Since the missingness of Expectations is wholly 
determined by the repetition number, it is “missing at random” with respect to Expectations 
once repetitions are controlled for, so that multiple imputation will be unbiased. Multiple 
imputation was done with the Amelia II software.14 Expectations is highly significant, and the 
coefficient on P1 take × Same group shrinks by about a third. However, it remains significant. 
We also used another way to control for the effect of expectations. In each repetition of sessions 
11 and 12, one player’s second round take was determined randomly, by a computerized draw 
from the uniform distribution on {0,...,50}.15 Their second round partners knew this, and both 
partners were paid as normal. Subjects’ expectations about P2’s play ought not to be affected by 
P1’s play when P2’s play is randomly determined. Column 3 of Table 4 interacts equation (2) 
with a dummy variable P2 random. The coefficient on P1 take × Same group × P2 random is 
actually positive, although the summed coefficient is imprecisely estimated.  
Overall, both expectations and preferences seem to matter for group reciprocity. However, we 
                                                 
13 If we do not multiply impute Expectations, we lose all repetitions other than 2 and 7. Results 
on repetitions 2 and 7 alone are insignificant whether or not Expectations are included. 
14 Expectations was imputed from the following variables: first round amount taken by 
participant F, first and second round amounts taken by the subject and his/her own round 1 and 
round 2 partners, lags of these amounts from the previous repetition; amount the subject last 
saw taken by a participant from the same colour group as the current partner; a quadratic in 
repetition (from 1 to 8), and treatment dummies. 
15 To gather more information, these sessions only included first party treatments, with two 
repetitions of each color treatment. 
caution that in our setup, controlling for expectations is intrinsically hard. Ideally, this could be 
done in a one-shot experiment. 
We argue that group reciprocity can be motivated by fairness concerns. To test this another way, 
we examine whether, in random bonus sessions, more group reciprocity is displayed towards 
members of the team that won the random bonus. Column 4 of table 4 interacts equation (2) 
with a dummy for if the round 2 partner is a Bonus winner. The interaction term P1 take × 
Same group × Bonus winner is positive, but not significant. However, our results vary with the 
regression specification, and we are not confident that we can definitively answer this question, 
so we do not report a result. 
Lastly we examine how identity concerns relate to intergroup reciprocity. Social Identity 
Theory (SIT) holds that individuals support their group, and discriminate against other groups, 
in order to protect the self-esteem they derive from their social identity as a group member. If 
revenge is a form of group discrimination, SIT would predict that subjects with the strongest in-
group identity will be most likely to take group revenge. Our final questionnaire included 
standard measures of group identity. Subjects indicated their level of agreement on a 7-point 
Likert scale to two statements: “I felt commited to my group” and “Members of the 
green/orange/purple/brown group worked well together as a team”.  We sum answers to these 
to create the variable Group ID. We found: 
 
Result 5: Subjects with higher levels of in-group identification showed higher levels of group 
reciprocity. 
 
Column 5 of Table 4 interacts equation (2) with Group ID. The interaction term P1 take × 
Same group × Group ID is significant at the 5% level.16  
 
  
                                                 
16 A pooled linear regression without fixed effects also gives a significant result at 5%. A Tobit 
model and a linear regression model including controls for the history of play did not reach 
significance, although the coefficients had the same signs.  
Table 4: Estimates of group reciprocity, first party treatments, random bonus sessions. 
Dependent variable: amount taken by subjects in the round 2 PGG. Robust standard errors 
clustered by individual in parentheses. + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
P1 take (β) -0.0363 -0.0526 0.0433 0.0505 0.0322 
 (0.055)  (0.0414)  (0.0399)  (0.0442) (0.0384)  
Same group (γ) -5.39 -3.57 -3.7 -4.2 -3.49 
 (2.57) * (1.62) * (1.82) * (2.01) * (1.75) * 
P1 take ✕ Same group (δ) 0.271 0.129 0.18 0.147 0.179 
 (0.0758) *** (0.0468) ** (0.0542) *** (0.0603) * (0.0525) *** 
P1 take ✕ Fair 0.134 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.0771) +     
Same group ✕ Fair 2.73 -- -- -- -- 
 (3.52)      
P1 take ✕ Same group ✕ Fair -0.174 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.105) +     
Expectations -- 0.628 -- -- -- 
  (0.0535) ***    
P2 random -- -- 8.41 -- -- 
   (5.17)    
P1 take ✕ P2 random  -- -- -0.206 -- -- 
   (0.143)    
Same group ✕ P2 random -- -- -4.47 -- -- 
   (6.45)    
P1 take ✕ Same group ✕ P2 random -- -- 0.0947 -- -- 
   (0.19)    
Bonus winner -- -- -- -2.23 -- 
    (3.16)  
F take ✕ Bonus winner -- -- -- -0.0659 -- 
    (0.087)  
Same group ✕ Bonus winner -- -- -- 1.11 -- 
    (4.27)  
F take ✕ Same group ✕ Bonus 
winner 
-- -- -- 0.141 -- 
    (0.119)  
P1 take ✕ Group ID -- -- --  -0.02 
     (0.0163)  
Same group ✕ Group ID -- -- --  -1.9 
     (0.767) * 
P1 take ✕ Same group ✕ Group ID -- -- --  0.0572 
     (0.0231) * 
Model Linear Linear with multiple 
imputation 
Linear Linear Linear 
Controls Period and indiv. FE Period and indiv. FE Period and indiv. 
FE 
Period and indiv. FE Period and indiv. FE 
N 832 832 832 832 832 
N indiv. 192 192 192 192 192 
Adj. R2 0.0404 0.217 0.0387 -0.252 0.0431 
  
  
  
6. Conclusion 
Our experiment reproduced intergroup revenge in a controlled laboratory setting. When 
subjects were harmed in a public goods game, they reciprocated the same way against other 
people in their partner's group, but not against members of a control group. 
Although subjects’ behaviour appears to be reciprocal, other explanations are also possible, 
such as a desire to equalize payoffs with members of a specific outgroup. This is analogous to 
possible interpretations of ultimatum game behaviour (Güth et al. 1982; Falk et al. 2003). More 
research is needed to understand the motivations behind the choices observed here. 
Much existing experimental work examines short or one-shot games (Fershtman and Gneezy 
2001; Chen and Li 2009; Habyarimana et al. 2009; cf. Bornhorst et al. 2010). Subjects begin an 
interaction with a predetermined or experimentally induced level of in-group bias, which 
affects their choices. Our paper complements this approach by examining intergroup dynamics. 
For instance, many conflicts are driven by cycles of revenge, in which bystanders are harmed 
for their fellow group members’ actions. Some observers blame not deep intergroup hatreds but 
self-interested politicians and hired thugs (Brass 1997; Kaufman 2001; cf. Glaeser 2005). Our 
results show that even absent these factors, humans may take revenge upon groups. But 
subjects only did so when there were arbitrary between-group inequalities, which were 
associated with lower perceptions of fairness. 
We suggest three areas for future research. Firstly, experiment participants did not reciprocate 
for actions affecting other people, even other in-group members.  Reciprocation by third parties 
may be important, because it causes conflict to spread. Stronger group identity treatments, or 
longer interactions, might lead to third party reciprocity. 
Second, our experiment cannot tell us whether group reciprocity is innate or learned. Primates 
appear to reciprocate against attackers’ kin (Aureli at al. 1992), suggesting the former. But 
humans may also learn group reciprocity in response to strategic incentives (Chagnon 1988; 
Hardin 1995; Fearon and Laitin 1996). 
Lastly, we know little about the connection between perceived unfairness and group behavior. 
We need to understand what contexts create intergroup resentment and how this psychology 
plays out in particular environments. In public economics, perceptions that certain groups act 
corruptly or manipulate the tax system may lead disadvantaged groups to behave non-
cooperatively, e.g. by evading taxes (cf. Alm and Torgler 2006); similarly, the introduction of 
“unfair” policies may damage intergroup cooperation. Ultimately, understanding intergroup 
dynamics could help policy-makers to manage them better and to forestall their worst effects. 
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